The Cruise Missile Technology Control Regime and Nonproliferation: Why States Comply with Cruise Missile Export Controls

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Abstract

Since its inception in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has successfully slowed the development of ballistic missiles by raising the cost of acquiring ballistic missile technology and limiting access to foreign assistance and technology. On the other hand, cruise missile proliferation has significantly increased as an indirect consequence. This thesis seeks to answer the question, “Why do states comply with cruise missile export controls?” Drawing upon previous studies, I investigate if compliance is primarily influenced by a state’s capacity, economic interests, or security interests. To do this, I select ten countries that have similar capabilities and also possess cruise missiles, but are not members of the MTCR. In a chart designed to visually compare the data, my hypotheses are tested by four independent variables against my dependent variable, compliance. Because no standardized measurement of compliance with the MTCR already exists, I construct my own measurement that combines the MTCR’s listed guidelines, reports about each selected states’ actions, and records of various elements of enforcement, such as sanctions and arms trade records. The results indicate that security interests are the most influential factor in determining if a state complies with cruise missile export controls.